An Essay on Understanding and Interpretation (Epistemology)
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This is an effort in epistemology.
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When one tries to understand knowing and knowledge
one may proceed from that which is known,
or from the process by which one knows.
My preference is for the latter;
because knowledge itself is to me either unattainable or elusive.
Therefore my purpose is to describe how we know,
to describe what we experience in the process of knowing,
or presuming to know,
how we understand and how we interpret.
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The obvious advantage of proceeding in this manner 
is that the investigation is independent
of the validity of any knowledge;
what I have to say should be meaningful,
even where the purported knowledge
which is the consequence of the process of understanding
is deficient or false.
In the more conventional approach,
one relies on the assumption
that certain knowledge is secure;
one then constructs ones edifice of reasoning,
only to be embarrassed by the circumstance
that the foundation on which one built,
the purported facts, are deficient;
so that the edifice collapses, 
not from impractical design or inefficient execution,
but for lack of a secure foundation,
on account of the untenable presumptions on
which it relies.
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Subjective vs Objective Knowldge
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At the outset it is necessary to broach the
issue of whether knowledge,
that which is known,
should be considered
as something known by many persons,
or as something known by only a single individual,
to whom other knowing individuals in general are similar,
and with the respect to knowledge are identical.
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Although there is likely to be much debate on the topic,
to my mind the issue of private vs public knowledge
as the proper target of epistemology
is resolved by the consideration
that even the purportedly common knowledge,
to become meaningful,
must be understood by the individual
who is part of that community.
At the same time its objectivity,
its potential accessibility to more than one individual,
as the essential characteristic of all knowledge,
must remain unimpaired.
The distinction between what is known only by me,
and what is known by me and by others is very important.
It may serve as the starting point of our investigation.
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I call knowledge which I perceive, which I experience,
to the extent that such perception and experience
are unique to myself, subjective knowledge.
By definition,
subjective knowledge is accessible to
and meaningful only to him who knows.
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I call knowledge which is perceived
by a group of two or more individuals
objective knowledge,
insofar as it is perceived by them similarly,
i.e. insofar as the knowledge,
that which is known,
imposes on the minds of the individuals
who participate in it, who know it, a common structure.
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Thus all knowledge will potentially or actually
participate in both aspects, in both realms.
From one perspective it will be subjective,
from another perspective it will be objective.
The individual who knows will intuitively
construe his knowledge to be objective
to the extent that he expects it to be shared by others;
he will consider it subjective, to the extent that
he perceives it to be unique and specific to himself.
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Causation
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I have suggested an epistemology of process rather than of result.
I have made a tentative preliminary distinction
between subjective and objective knowledge.
I must now consider yet another fundamental concept:
that of causation:
because our view of the world
is constituted of multiple concepts or objects.
These may be viewed as being independent of one another;
frequently however, two or more such concepts appear related.
The relationship between two objects is then one of causation,
that one should be caused by or the cause of the other,
or that both should be caused by a third.
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We commonly illustrate causation
by simple mechanical constructs.
A glass shatters upon a stone.
The stone, we say, caused the glass to shatter.
Or was it the energy of the impact.
Or was it the brittleness of the glass.
Or was it all three?
We look more closely.
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We hold a glass some feet above a stone floor.
We release it; gravity causes it to fall,
the resistance of air impedes its fall;
the glass strike the stone;
the energy of momentum is translated
into tensions within the glass and the stome.
The stress causes strains
within the respective materials and deforms them;
the limits of elasticity determine
whether and to what extent
the respective objects will be deformed,
transiently or permanently,
or whether they will fracture;
and into which cleavage planes.
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Causation has a dual root.
One branch of its root is objective:
the observation that concepts follow one upon the other
and that the first brings about the second,
or that absent the first, the second would not occur.
Aristotle dealt with this issue and found various causes:
Original causes, final causes, effective causes,
material causes, formal causes.
The uncertainty of causation
limits its usefulness in the abstract.
Specific instances of causation are defined
by circumstances, and the effectiveness of
causation is then a statistical function of
repeated occurrences.
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The other branch of its root is subjective:
the experience that many of my actions
are characterized by anticipation thereof.
Because I am aware of what I am about to do,
aware of what I am doing,
I am under the impression that
what I am doing is under my control,
is an expression of my will.
And this anticipation,
this awareness or illusion of control satisfies me;
it is essential to our well-being,
to my awareness of myself.
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Objective causation is invariably
statistical in its certainty.
Even if certain events appear to occur
with virtually absolute certainty,
it is important to remember
that these too are statistically linked.
It is the mathematical law that we invent,
of which we assume that it underlies them
which appears to apply with absolute certainty.
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The power of causation is reflected
in the compulsion of the will.