Negative theology is a reflection of the absolute qualitative difference between the divine and the human mind that purports to apprehend the divine. The 14th edition of Windelband-Heimsoeth "Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie" traces "negative theology" as far back as the Neo-Pythagoreans and their identification of God with unity or the number 1. Negative theology began explicitly with the theologian and philosopher Philo who postulated a distinction between God and all things finite so great that no qualities whatsoever can be ascribed to him. Since God is above all earthly things one can say nothing about him except that no specific characteristics can be attributed to him. God cannot be described in the terms that the human mind predicates of other things. Philo's interpretation was accepted by the Christian apologists, especially Justinian, and by some of the Gnostics. According to Windelband, similar notions occur in Neoplatonism, and in Plotinus who postulates a formless unity which is prior both to the spiritual and to the physical world. Plotinus' successors went even further: Iamblichos wrote of God as an unspeakable origin (pante arretos arche). The only attribute of God which this ancient "negative theology" permitted was infinity. God was boundless, literally indefined and undefinable. Subsequently, the boundlessness of deity became an important theme of medieval mysticism. Deshalb aber musz der Urgrund aller Dinge, die Gottheit, ueber Sein und Erkenntnis hinausliegen; sie ist Uebervernunft, Uebersein, ihr fehlt jede Bestimmung, sie ist "Nichts". Aber diese "Gottheit" der negativen Theologie offenbart sich in dem dreieinigen Gotte, und der seiende und erkennende Gott schafft aus dem Nichts die Kreaturen deren Ideen er in sich erkennt; denn dies Erkennen ist sein Schaffen. (Windelband 287) Beyond medieval mysticism, Spinozas definition of God as substance has been construed as an expression of negative theology. I ask whether one might not identify negative theology much earlier than does Windelband. I interpret the reluctance of the Jews even to voice the Name of God as indicating that nothing can be said about God which does not contradict his being. My surmise that negative theology is especially congenial to the Jewish experience of deity, appears to be corroborated by the circumstance that two of its most prominent representatives, Philo and Spinoza drew heavily upon the Jewish tradition. It may be argued that there is an inconsistency in the Ten Commandments to the extent that they both constrain the naming of God (Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain) but then proceed to a functional definition of God in the articulation of his will. Perhaps Moses breaking the tablets of the law may reflect not (only) his anger with the idolatry of the people of Israel but his frustration and despair with the paradox that an infinite and unknowable God should express himself so explicitly on tablets of stone, where especially the last eight of those commandments appear to be incompatible with the inscrutable anonymity of their author. In any event, negative theology seems to be integral to the Judaic-Christian tradition, and the logical discontinuity between negative theology and its opposite, positive theology, is vividly reflected both in the content and in the style of Bonhoeffer's work. In his Sanctorum Communio in which he posits the church rather than deity as the point of departure of his analysis, Bonhoeffer largely avoids positive characterizations of God. Instead he resorts to the modern distinction between subjective and objective to define God as a subjective participant in personality, thereby also avoiding any need for specifying God's objective attributes. It follows that it is impossible to indulge in objective descriptions of the divine, without compromising the validity of the subjective experience of God. The validity of the argument is demonstrated by a consideration of the opposite. Suppose it were possbile for man to make valid objective specification of the divine, we should have virtually as many Gods as there are human beings, for each one of us would fashion his own deity to suit himself, and attribute to God his own characteristics. The farmer would say, God is a farmer. The physicist would say, God is a physicist. The scholar would say, God is a professor, whereupon we should be at one another's throats, condemning, attacking, and ultimately killing one another. The very humanness of our inventions would be the clearest indication that God does not exist, or that, if he does exist, we do not believe in him, but only in the idols that we have tailored to suit or own tastes. Thus the human presumption to be able to reveal what God is, leads us dialectically to conceal him. Conversely, deity reveals itself in the world even without the help of any of us humans, and does so all the more brightly in the shadow of our denials of him. Hence the paradox that the presumption to be well connected to God is the mark of godlessness, while silence or even outright denial may be evidence of great piety. That is a possible interpretation of Nietzsche. Beachtenswert ist auch Bonhoeffers Aueszerung, dasz Gott in die Person als Subjekt eingeht. Danach verstehe ich Bonhoeffers Gottesbegriff vergleichbar mit dem Ichbegriff, welcher auch seines Wesens nach nicht objektiv spezifiziert werden kann. Auch hier ein Anschlagen an Nietzsche's Betonung des Ich, im Gegensatz zur objektiven Vielheit der Menschen, im Gegensatz zur Herde. Bonhoeffer sieht aber in seinen spaeteren Schriften von Ausfuehrung dieser technich theoretischen philosophischen Begriffe ab. Es mag sein dasz er das Paradox, den Widerspruch erkannt hat der die Subjektivitaet, sei es des Menschen oder des Gottes, objektiv darzustellen beansprucht. Wo die objektive Wirklichkeit Gottes ausfaellt, da vermag der Mensch nichts ueber Gott auszusagen, denn die Aussage ueber ein Ding ist das Merkmal, das Zeichen, der Inbegriff seiner Objektivierung. Die schlichte, anspruchslose Beziehung auf Gott bleibt umso staerker eindrucksvoller und wirksamer, weil sie unartikuliert, unausgesprochen bleibt. Die Haeufigkeit mit welcher Bonhoeffer seine Ausfuehrungen mit einer Berufung auf Gott oder Jesus Christus bekraeftigt ist vor allem bemerkenswert insofern er dennoch nichts positives ueber die Beschaffenheit des Goettlichen aussagt. Sein Bestreben ist die Wirksamkeit des Goettlichen im Gemuete des Frommen zu konstatieren. Diese Anrufe sind Zeugnisse (testimony) fuer die Wirklichkeit Gottes. Er laeszt die biblischen Aussagen, bezw. Berichte ueber Gott und Christus auf sich beruhen; Er unterlaeszt es sie zu verzieren oder erweitern. Es ist ein Audruck des Geistes der negativen Theologie, dasz Bonhoeffer es noch nicht einmal fuer noetig haelt sie gegen Angriffe, wie etwa von Seite Nietzsches, zu schuetzen. Denn Gott nehauptet sich selbst. Zwar ist es moeglich seine negative Theologie zu aeuszern in dem man sich ausdruecklich zu ihr bekennt, etwa wie Philon, Eckhart oder Spinoza, indem man eine dogmatische Behauptung aufstellt, wie etwa, "Ueber Gott laeszt sich sich nichts Menschliches aussagen," oder aber inbegriffen, im Sinne bonhoefferscher Ethik, indem man bei aller ausgesprochenen Bemuehung um das Goettliche, es dennoch unterlaeszt die Unendlichkeit des Goettlichen durch beschreibende Bestimmungen (Spezifikationen) anzutasten. Diese Zurueckhaltung aeuszert sich in dem Verzicht Gott oder Jesus Christus dogmatisch zu definieren. Sie aeuszert sich aber noch kraeftiger in dem Verzicht sich als Richter ueber Gottes Gesetz zu erheben. Bonhoeffer enthaelt sich nicht nur der Versuchung Gottes Namen, seinen Wohnort, seine Adresse im Universum seine Eigenschaften oder auch seinen Beruf zu bestimmen; er schreckt auch davor zurueck, dem Willen Gottes als Urteilender oder Richtender fuer sich in Anspruch zu nehmen. Nur subjektiv, als auf Gottes Wort Hoerender, als Gottes Gebot unter den gegeben Umstaenden Gehorchender offenbart er jeweilig in den eigenen Handlungen das goettliche Gebot an ihn und nur an ihn. So etwa die Hervorhebung des Tuns ueber das Richten. Tun ist subjektive Erfuellung des Gesetzes; Richten ist die anmassende Objektivierung, Vergegenstaendlichung des Gesetzes. Die objektive Erfuellung des Gesetzes in den Augen der Menschen ist Heuchelei. Nur inwendig, subjektiv, gemaesz den Forderungen Gottes in der konkreten Situation darf, kann Gottes Gesetz erfuellt werden. Gegenueber dieser Deutung von Bonhoeffer's Theologie als negativer Theologie, muessen wir nun die positiven Ausfuehrungen erklaeren welche Bonhoeffer ueber den Willen Gottes macht; denn dasz auch er, in der Aussetzung seiner vier goettlichen Mandate, Gottes Willen zu definieren beansprucht soll nicht bestritten werden. Es liegt darin ein Widerspruch einerseits zu sagen, "Richtet nicht", und andererseits die Regeln aufzustellen nach denen der Pfarrer jedenfalls die Beichte der Gemeindemitglieder hoert. Auch meine ich bemerkt zu haben, dasz es gerade die moralischen Postulate sind, die Bonhoeffer in den Mandaten aufstellt, welche in ihrer durch Bonhoeffer's Inwendigkeit bestaerkte Eindringlichkeit (impressiveness) die Beteiligten an dieser Diskussionsgruppe ungebuehrlich beeindruckt haben, und sie zu dem Miszverstaendnis von Bonhoeffers als einer Moraltheologie verleitet haben. Die ueberzeugendste Erklaerung welche ich fuer diesen Widerspruch oder scheinbaren Widerspruch finden kann, ist die Deutung der Mandate als Predigt, als Auslegung der Schrift fuer die Gemeinde, als Erfuellung der spezifischen Pflicht des Pfarrers, Gottes Wort der Gemeinde zugaenglich zumachen. Doch sind auch diese Mandate ihrem Stil entsprechend viel zu allgemein, viel zu dogmatisch, viel zu doctrinaer um in ihrer dargebotenen Gestalt als Predigt zu taugen. Ich deute sie als Notizen, als Aufzeichnungen, welche der Pfarrer sich vorbereitend fuer sein seelsorgisches Amt, sei es nun Predigt oder Beichte, aufgezeichnet hat; und es sollte mich wundern wenn er in der Anwendung seiner Maxime anders verfuehre, als auf die konkrete, umstaendliche Lage in welcher er sich auf sie verlaeszt hineinzufuehlen, und somit die Schuld und den Schmerz des Suenders oder der Suenderin welche sich aus der Notlage der Suende ergibt, mit ihm oder mit ihr zu tragen; indem der Pfarrer sich mit dem Betroffenen in einer Weise gleichstellt, die es ihm ermoeglicht, in der konkreten Situation an der Suendenlast des Bueszers mitzutragen. Das waere die praktische moralische Auswirkung einer negativen Theologie. But it is not only on the ethical but also in the epistemological aspects of his theology, that the discontinuity between positive and negative theology becomes apparent. In the first place we consider Bonhoeffers acceptance of the Jesus of the Gospels, the incarnation, in which God defined himself as human. One might think that this would put an end to any controversy or uncertainty about negative theology; but in fact it does not. It only translates the scene on which the competition between positive and negative theology is carried out. And the appearance of the Messiah, far from resolving the theological problem makes it infinitely more difficult. For while the God of the Old Testament is far more susceptible to negative theologic interpretation; the emotional and figurative immediacy of Jesus, whose very humanity so impresses us, of whom we are tempted to speak as of a guest in our living room or an honored speaker at our conventions. The paradox is that Jesus is like us and not like us. To defamiliarize Jesus, assert his infinity, to place him in the universe as a cosmic force, to apply to him, whose finite earthly sojourns have been so eloquently and persuasively recorded in the gospels, the parentheses of negative theology is a task of which only the beginning has been made. And yet the human, the familiar Jesus, the Jesus as a participant in our society does not satisfy our needs and seems somehow wrong, primitive, idolatrous. It is perhaps not unfair to argue that Bonhoeffer evades this problem; and he evades it in a manner which is both conventional and unique. Bonhoeffers habit of invoking God or Jesus Christ is of course his priestly prerogative, but nonetheless we in attempting to understand and to interpret him, must ask ourselves what it is that he means, what it is that he is saying or trying to say when he appends to a sentence which is apparently complete in meaning, the words, through Jesus Christ or in Jesus Christ. The positivistic philosophers of recent memory (no relation to positive theologians) tell us that a sentence is meaningful to the extent that it can be translated into algorithms of mathematical logic. Bonhoeffer's invocations of God and Jesus Christ fail this test. To say that they have an emotive, a poetic meaning is to come closer to the truth. I think they are in fact expressions of negative theology; expressions of the fact that the nature of God and of Jesus as God is such as to be beyond decription. When Bonhoeffer invokes God or Jesus Christ in this manner, he in effect lapses into a metalanguage which is indicative of the undefinability of God. The further description of this metalanguage is a separate topic consideration of which I would like, for the time being, to defer. I am also impressed by the profusion in all of Bonhoeffer's writing that I have read of references to God without any attempt at elaboration or explanation; so that the crude inference might be drawn that the attributes of God should be so universally known that any enumeration of them was superfluous, or that the references to God were a kind of ritual incantation without deeper meaning. The frequency with which Bonhoeffer refers to God is of course equalled or exceeded by the frequency with which he invokes Jesus Christ, of whose life we have an historical record so that with reference to Jesus the concept of negative theology should be inapplicable. This circumstance leads me to suggest an expansion of the concept of negative theology. If the proposition that nothing can be articulated about the _existence_ of God except for negatives, what he is not, is supplemented with the proposition that anything that can be articulated about the _function_ of God in the experience of individuals is inadequate to the fullness of that experience, then Bonhoeffers frequent unqualified allusions to Jesus Christ will also begin to fit into a framework of negative theology. Finally, in the context of our discussions about Bonhoeffer and Nietzsche, that the statement that God is dead acquires a different significance in the light of negative theology. For if the statement that "God is alive" is meaningless (and therefore harmless) with respect to the reality of God inasmuch as he is beyond all description, then the statement that "God is dead" is equally meaningless and therefore equally harmless with respect to the reality of God. But if in the light of negative theology the statement "God is alive" is misleading and deceptive in so far as God's life, whatever it may be, is far beyond our power to conceive, then the statement "God is dead", while saying nothing about God, serves to neutralize and to render spiritually harmless the misleading claims about God's life. The corollaries of negative theology are important. If all that can be said truly of God is negative, the positive statements purporting to assert characteristics or qualities of God fail in their intent. A god who is explicitly described will be an idol. Perhaps the true believer is a public atheist, since it is not he whom Jesus describes as praying in public on the street corners, but he who shuts the door of his closet before he prays to the father in secret. Matthew 6:5-6. The person whose life is suffused by the presence of God will hardly be offended by the atheist. Since he cannot conceive of a godless world, he will be inclined to assume that the atheist has only retired to his closet and shut the door before saying his prayers. Thus atheism, far from being a rejection, may, in its "Umwertung aller Werte" be construed as an affirmation of God.