Wanda Warren Berry writes:

> I think it might be interesting to compare Kierkegaard's
> use of subjectivity and objectivity to Kant.  It has been
> a long time since I read the Prolegomena to Any Future
> Metaphysic, but i think Kant there and elsewhere redefines
> "objectivity" as having consonance with the universal
> presuppostions and categories of rational being. 
> "Subjectivity" is individaul.  Am I right?  For example,
> the "objectivity" of a moral rule is its consnace with
> the very form of law/the Categorical Imperative. 
> Kant makes this move after analyzing the limitations
> of the human effort to gain certainty through empirical
> knowledge understand as grounded in sense experience
> (what kant calls intuition?)

I have looked again at the Prolegomena and the Critique
of Pure Reason with Wanda's question in mind.

At the outset, we would do well, I think, to take
to heart Kierkegaard's own evaluation of his relationship
to thinkers such as Kant:

     "The difficulty that inheres in existence, with which
      the existing individual is confronted, is one that
      never really comes to expression in the language of
      abstract thought, much less receives an explanation."
                        Concluding Unscientific Postscript
                                      Part II, Chapter 3

The language of abstract thought, Kierkegaard tells us,
is beside the point; and I think a review of the texts in 
issue will corroborate his judgment.

In the Paragraph 46 of the Prolegomena, Kant begins by 
recapitulating the scholastic definition of subject,
as that which remains of substances after all accidental
predicates have been removed, and he points out that
in this sense subject is unknowable. Kant acknowledges
"dieses Substantiale" (something substantial) in the
consciousness of self, but we have knowledge of it not
absolutely, but only by inference from inner appearances,
(innere Erscheinungen). So far as Kant is concerned,
there seems to be no difference between the empirical
nature of outward and inward experience. Kant does not
seem to be interested in the explication of subjective
experience for its own sake. His primary intent is
to demonstrate that the consciousness of self permits no
inferences concerning the mortality of the soul.

Kant expands his ideas in the Critique of Pure Reason:

     "The consciousness of the self, according to the
     determinations of our state in inner perception
     is merely empirical, and always in process of
     change... That which has to be represented as of
     necessity numerically identical cannot be thought
     as such through empirical data. There must be a
     condition which precedes all experience, and renders
     experience  itself  possible, if a transcendental
     pre-supposition of this kind is to be rendered
     valid.... This pure original unchangeable
     consciousness I shall name transcendental
     apperception."
                         Critique of Pure Reason, A 107
                          Norman Kemp Smith translation

Kant's transcendental apperception differs from Kierkegaard's
subjectivity, in that Kant deemed the experiences thus 
apperceived to be eminently objective, such as color, shape
and other similar categories of perception.  Stirrings
of love and hate, of hope and despair, of faith and of 
doubt as constitute inwardness in Kierkegaard's world,
have no function in Kant's epistemological or ethical edifices.

The answer to Wanda's question, I think, should be sought
not in the analysis of texts, but in an understanding of the
revolutions in feeling and thought that swept through Europe
in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, first with
the flourishing of "Sturm und Drang," then with the Romantic
movement in literature and in religion.  Kierkegaard's writings
are inconceivable without the Romanticism that nourished them,
and I suspect Kant would have had no more sympathy for
Kierkegaard's concerns than have the mathematical logicians
who have dominated American philosophy for the past half century.