Opher Kutner writes: > Abraham was being tested to examine the level > of his relationship to God. In Kabbala (and in Chassidism), > there are two natures of man's relationship with > God - out of Love, which is the higher level, > and out of fear, a lower one. Abraham didn't pass > with flying colors, according to the Gur Rabbi. > By obeying His command, he showed absolute faith - > out of fear. If he had loved God, HE WOULD HAVE ARGUED > (as he did with the Sodom affair). > It seems to me very meaningful to distiguish between Abraham who argued with God about saving Sodom on account of the minority of the righteous within it, and Abraham who prepares without question or complaint to carry out God's command that he sacrifice Isaac. If one chooses to interpret the temptation of Abraham literally, as both Kierkegaard in "Fear and Trembling" and the rabbi quoted by Opher seem to me to have done, then one might consider whether Abraham's failure to argue about the prospective sacrifice of Isaac reflects rather than a deficient love of God, or, for that matter of Isaac, a paralysis of thought and feeling precipitated by the terror of the idea (Vorstellung) that he himself should plunge the knife into his son, whom we are told that he loved. Abraham's relationship to Isaac was surely more intimate than his relationship to the anonymous righteous Sodomite minority for whose lives he pleaded with God. However, I am sceptical of the wisdom of purporting to give a "literal interpretation" to any text. It is seldom indeed that a text evokes for a reader an intellectual and emotional experience identical with that out of which the author composed it. Literal truth is just that: the truth of words: and the truth of words is trivial in the context of experience. "Literal interpretations" of the Bible seem to me to be unavoidably inconsistent and invariably to serve not spiritual but ideological and political purposes. To insist on the literal interpretation of Scripture is often to trivialize its symbolic (spiritual) meaning, and this seems to me to be especially true of the temptation of Abraham. When I recently reread Kierkegaard's "Fear and Trembling", I was reminded of the assertion of one of his translators (Hayo Gerdes) that Kierkegaard never doubted the teachings of Lutheran orthodoxy. The arguments of "Fear and Trembling", if I understand them correctly, rely on a totally literal construction of the pertinent chapters of Genesis. Kierkegaard demands that this literal construction, and more importantly, the absurdity of the temptation, be accepted as a matter of faith. I cannot agree. I find Kierkegaard's interpretation to be neither ethically nor aesthetically persuasive. It seems to me impious to postulate a deity whose fiendishness requires to be sanctified by an act of faith. It seems frivolous on Kierkegaards part, to correlate such fiendishness with the personal catastrophe of a broken engagement. I am mindful, of course, that in disavowing Kierkegaard's interpretation, I lay myself open to charges on the one hand, of insufficiency of religious faith, and on the other hand, of naivete in matters of theological hermeneutics. I prefer to interpret the Temptation of Abraham as mythology, as a story which germinated and grew in the collective consciousness of a people that considered deity its protector, and itself the protectorate of deity. The details of provenance, whether the account is the composition of a single author, or a cumulative oral tradition, are irrelevant both to the sancticity of the story and to its spiritual (symbolic) truth. I see in Abraham Adam's double (Doppelgaenger). As Adam was the original biological father (Urvater), so Abraham was the original spiritual father. As Adam first experienced biological life, so Abraham first experienced faith, a living relationship to God. As Adam had to be expelled from Eden to secure divine sovereignty over nature, (lest Adam live forever and become like God), so the spiritual union with God that is implicit in God's promise to Abraham to make him the (spiritual) father of uncounted descendants, required a dialectical retraction. Abraham's journey to Mount Moriah is the counterpart of Adam's expulsion from Paradise. In each case the sin to be expiated was the implicit threat of competing with and displacing deity. The expulsion from Eden and the drama on the summit of Moriah each serve to secure the inviolability of deity, "to show who is boss", if one will pardon this lapse into the colloquial. The theme of retraction pervades many parts of Scripture with which I am familiar. With the expulsion of Adam and Eve, God took back Eden, with the Flood, he took back the earth, with the tower of Babel, he took back the rationality of language, with the breaking of the tablets, he took back the holiness of the law, and with the symbolic sacrifice of Isaac, he took back his promise to Abraham to make him the progenitor of God's chosen people. From this perspective, Kierkegaard's sentimental annotations about Abraham's journey to Mount Moriah seem to me superfluous. Ernst Meyer review@netcom.com