Ernst Meyer wrote:

>> In the Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
>> Kierkegaard had asserted that Subjectivity
>> is the Truth, clearly implying, if not stating
>> explicitly, that Objectivity is Untruth. 

Kevin Solway replied:

> On the contrary, I think he was saying
> that it is an Objective truth that Subjectivity
> is the Truth.  In other words, Subjectivity is truth
> no matter what any particular individual may feel
> about the matter.

I ask myself, and I ask my readers: Does it make sense
to say that "it is an Objective truth that Subjectivity
is the Truth." I ask: If Truth is subjectivity, can
objectivity be anything other than untruth?

The identification of truth with subjectivity, with
objectivity, with both, or with neither, is a topic
of much interest to me. While I am concerned that my
dwelling on the issue may precipitate a flurry of
exasperated "unsubscribe" requests, I explore this question
nonetheless because I believe that the identification of
subjectivity with truth is Kierkegaard's singular contribution
to epistemology, the implications of which are as yet 
largely unexplored.

The response which Kierkegaard's unqualified identification
of truth with subjectivity elicits from contributors to this
List is uniformly extenuating. They offer apologies which in
one form or another carry the implication that Kierkegaard
didn't really mean the statement "Subjectivity is the Truth,"
to be taken at face value.  So too, Kevin Solway's two comments
on this issue. He writes " ... (Kierkegaard) was saying that
it is an Objective truth that subjectivity is the Truth."
This statement can be meaningful only if there are two
kinds of truths, subjective and objective. That there should
be two truths, subjective and objective, applicable to but
a single species of knowledge, would render meaningless either
the antithesis between subjective and objective, or would render
meaningless the notion of truth. Phrased differently: to say
that in a given respect subjectivity is truth is simultaneously
to assert that in this same respect objectivity cannot be truth,
and must therefore be falsehood. If objectivity is untruth,
it is meaningless to say that _any_ statement is objectively
true. 

Kevin Solway's explanation: "Subjectivity is truth no matter
what any particular individual may feel about the matter,"
only increases the confusion; and is equivalent to saying
in computer (C) programming language (A == A) == (A != A),
or in words: "A equals A", is identical with "A does not equal A".
"What any individual may feel" is a paraphrase of the term
subjectivity. Therefore to say "Subjectivity is truth no
matter what any particular individual may feel about the matter,"
is equivalent to saying "Subjectivity is truth no matter if
subjectivity is truth or is untruth." In that obscurity the
meaning of Kierkegaard's radical assertion is lost. So let's
start over:

As a model of subjectivity, as a primitive but cogent example,
let's consider the pain of a toothache. Only the patient feels
the pain; only the patient knows what it is to have a toothache.
The patient can provide much objective information about
the toothache, which tooth it is that hurts, what brings
on the pain, what relieves it, the time of the onset of pain
and the time of its disappearance. The dentist can obtain
by physical examination and X-ray other valuable objective
knowledge about the etiology, diagnosis and therapy of the
toothache. The objective knowledge can be shared among many
individuals. Objective knowledge can certainly vary in validity,
some being more reliable than other; but it can never approximate
the subjective knowledge of what it feels to have a toothache.

We are confronted in fact with two species of knowledge, the
subjective knowledge of the pain, and the objective knowledge
of the potentially complex circumstances associated with it.
To these two classes of knowledge correspond two kinds of truth,
subjective truth, and objective truth. It is the availability
to us of but a single name for the two species of truth
that has misled us to the inference that there should similarly
be only a single species of knowledge.  This faulty inference has
been the source of much confusion.

Objective truth is, of course the truth of common sense,
the truth of natural science, and the truth of those
sciences which the Germans call Geisteswissenschaften,
Moral sciences in the vocabulary of J.S. Mill, objective
psychology, sociology and all historical disciplines.
The analysis of objective truth has been vigrously
pursued by all the sciences, each in its own domain.
The description and analysis of objective truth is a
project in epistemology in its own right.

Subjective truth is something entirely different.
To some aspects of subjective truth we may cautiously 
apply the terms feeling.  To other aspects of subjective
truth we may cautiously apply the terms faith.

When Kierkegaard said that subjectivity is truth, he was
asserting the primacy of subjective truth over objective
truth. Although he was not necessarily denying the
existence also of an objective truth, he was clearly
limiting its scope.  He was saying that an individual's
welfare in this life (and in the hereafter) depends on
what is subjectively true for him; that subjective rather
than objective truth is determinative of the individual's
blessedness. His statement also implies that there may be
a conflict between subjective and objective truth, and
that the convention of assigning primacy to objective
truth is in error.

The key to the distinction between subjective and
objective knowledge is the relative communicability
of each. In general, subjective knowledge is inward;
it is shared among individuals only with difficulty
and only incompletely.  The communication of subjective
knowledge is obscure.  Experience reminds us how commonly 
states of feeling are in fact communicated. Happiness,
sadness, fear, anger all seem to be communicable by mere
proximity of an individual so affected.
But the specific mode for the communication of 
subjective states, of subjective understanding, is art:
painting, drawing and sculpture, music, literature, and
especially poetry, Such communication is at once powerful
but uncertain and unpredictable in its effects.

In contrast to the difficulty, inefficiency and incompleteness
of the communication of what is subjective, objective knowledge
can be shared with relative ease and precision. Indeed it is
(largely) its communicability which is the criterion for
distinguishing between subjective and objective knowledge. 
The communicability of objective knowledge vastly enhances
the effectiveness of human action in a social context.
Communication of objective knowledge has literally created
the social world in which we live; it makes possible technology
and all the awesome accomplishments of modern science.
That is why we are enthralled by objective knowledge;
that is why, when we speak of truth, we usually refer
exclusively to objective truth, and why Kierkegaard's
assertion that subjectivity is truth is at one and the same
time so important, and so troublesome a stumbling block
for us.

Kierkegaard's historical position in the history of philosophy,
as I understand it, rests greatly on his success in securing
for subjective truth recognition of the central place that
it holds in human experience. With respect to the individual,
subjective truth _is_ of primary importance, and in the context
of subjective truth, objectivity, however valid in its own
sphere, is misleading, false, deceptive and destructive. This
is peculiarly the case in my profession (the practice of medicine)
which uncritical reliance on a mechanistic view of human nature
has brought literally to the brink of destruction. And in this
perspective, it is correct to argue that where subjectivity is
truth, objectivity is falsehood. A significant consequence of the
recognition of the primacy of subjective truth for the individual
is the possible re-integration of theology into the intellectual
mainstream of our age.  A second consequence of this recognition
is the provision for the thinker of an Archimedean fulcrum outside
the range of objective science from which he can investigate the
manner in which both the form and the content of that science
are determined, not only by the characteristics of the physical
world, not only by the intellectual characteristics of the
scientist, but perhaps most importantly, by the nature
and the reliability of the communication of objective 
knowledge which enables scientists and engineers to function
as a social organism comprised, literally, of uncounted numbers
of individuals.