                           20020116.00

     I am embarrassed not to have made myself understood
concerning the significance with respect to religious pluralism
of the concluding sentence of Either Or which defines truth as a
cognition identified by deep inward feeling.  My interpretation
of this definition of truth does not preclude this definition's
being a dialectical thesis to be complemented by its antithesis,
does not preclude other definitions of truth in Kierkegaard's
writings, does not preclude an evolution of insight or
understanding on his part which, at a later time in his life
might have led to a different, even contrary definition, and
specifically does not preclude the definition advanced by Wanda
Warren Berry of truth as what can be lived with transparently
before God.

     I think that the definition of truth as being inward,
private, and to that extent inscrutable by a potential adversary,
immunizes the individual who relies on such truth from all
challenges to his religious convictions.  A population of
individuals each of whom is beneficiary of his/her own deep inner
experience of truth, immune to harrassment and persecution by the
religious dogmatists of this world, John Calvin and Martin Luther
included, is precisely what I as a professed "religious
pluralist" envision. That, and nothing more, is what my previous
e-mail messages on the subject tried to convey.  How the
religious pluralist arrives at his/her convictions, whether by
deep inward emotion or otherwise, is an issue which I did not
address.

     The statement of Anti-Climacus, quoted by Wanda Warren Berry
"...to BE the truth is the only true explanation of what truth
is."  seems to me quite compatible with the statement that truth
is identified by "deep inward feeling". Permit me to explain: If
"being the truth", i.e. life as truth or living the truth is "the
only true explanation of what truth is," then truth is not
identifiable by logic, by dialectic or by any other mode of
rational discourse.  But to say that truth is identifiable (only)
by "deep inward feeling" is merely to use a different description
to support the same conclusion, namely that truth is not
identifiable by logic, by dialectic or by any other mode of
rational discourse.

     The reason for the proscription of reason as an identifier
of truth is that reason is a function of language.
Conceptualization, dialectic, logic are all of them grounded in
language, in speech. Speech is a social phenomenon.  It arises
from the need of human beings to communicate with one another and
to create a common conceptual, scientific and spiritual
environment. Speech is a confirmation of Aristotle's assertion
that man is a social animal.  But man's sociability has its
limitations.  Man needs his family and friends, his teachers and
students, his coworkers and colleagues, but man also needs to be
alone. He/she needs a refuge from the society of his fellow men.

     Historically this need for spiritual separateness has been
expressed in the concept of inwardness because prior to modern
times the externalization of the inner structure of the human
body was incompatible with its biological survival.  Consider,
for example, Kierkegaard's reference to the "deep stirrings of
the heart." Since the eighteenth century the term "subjectivity"
has been used to point to the need for spiritual (and
intellectual) separateness. The term "objective" has been used to
denote experience common to two or more individuals and such
experience consists preeminently the sharing of concepts and
words.  If the subjective-objective antinomy appears confusing,
this may be the case because the the terms subject and object
have undergone drastic reversals of meaning since antiquity when
they were first introduced.

     If one is willing - and able - to overlook the symbolism and
imagery of conventional religion, one may recognize the Judaic-
Christian tradition as the agony that reflects the tension
between the individual's dependence on society on the one hand
and on the other, the individuals need to be separate from it.

     Let us go back, in our imagination, to the time of Moses,
the Israelites were in bondage to the Egyptians, the Egyptians
themselves were in bondage to Pharaoh who was their king and
their god. Moses undertook to persuade the Israelites to exchange
their servitude of Pharaoh for service to a god that would make
them free.  The question therefore becomes, how must the god,
service to whom will make a man free be constituted? (beschaffen
sein)

     One will properly begin by asking, what is servitude?
Servitude is a relationship among men ...

     The test is existential, what can be lived with transparency
before God.

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