Dear Mr. Garmel, Thank you very much for your willingness to spend more time on the telephone discussing some of the legal issues in which I am embroiled. I am mindful that you have diverse obligations, and I hesitate to interrupt with a telephone call whatever work you happen to have before you. I myself on the other hand am virtually unemployed. I see not more than 4 or 5 patients a week, I'm usually home working on my computer, and always ready for a break. I respectfully suggest, therefore, that when you are in the mood and have time, you telephone me (617-484-8109) without regard to the hour of the day. In the very unlikely event that I happened to be seeing a patient, I would tell you, and you would not be offended. I anticipate with pleasure hearing from you. In order not to talk nonsense, I try to prepare myself in a more or less formal way for any conversation or discussion. This evening, there are two issues that are on my mind. 1) My argument is that words, specifically the words "does any work in plumbing and gas fitting" of 142 MGL 1, are properly interpreted by context. I have persuaded myself that this is in fact a cogent and powerful argument, relevant not only to the instant case, but to adjudication in general, and especially adjudication of claims arising from a 220 year old Constitution. My argument: that the code is ancient, but the context is contemporary; that while the words of the code are fixed, the context which alone gives them meaning is modern. I shall argue that 142 MGL 1, 3, 13, etc. were in fact reinterpreted and modified when the Board of State Examiners of Plumbers and Pipefitters was incorporated into the Division of Professional Licensure, and this Division in turn became part of the Office of Consumer Affairs; I shall argue that these administrative reorganizations are in fact revisions of the statute, in that they modify the context in which the statute is interpreted. They modify the context in which the Board of State Examiners etc functions, and alter the meaning of the terms under which said Board was established. The Board is now invested with the same authority and the same obligations of its sibling Boards. Does such an argument make sense to you? 2) My second uncertainty concerns the likely default of the Nantucket Building Department. They have until April 3, 2009 to file an Answer. The lawyers which represent Nantucket defaulted also in the previous action in which I was involved, I don't know why. Since it requires much more paperwork to recover from a default than to file a timely Answer to a Complaint, the effect of the default if it is contested, is to increase the legal work and presumably the legal fees received by the Town's attorneys. I won't make that my business. My concern: what role must I play in the resolution of the default issue in order to protect my interests. The relevant regulation is MCPR Rule 55. Mass. Civil Procedure Rule 55 RULE 55. DEFAULT (Effective March 1, 2008). (a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter his default. (b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows: (1) By the Clerk. When the plaintiff's claim against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain, the clerk upon request of the plaintiff and upon affidavit of the amount due and affidavit that the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person, shall enter judgment for that amount and costs against the defendant, if he has been defaulted for failure to appear. (2) By the Court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor; but no judgment by default shall be entered against an infant or incompetent person unless represented in the action by a general guardian, conservator, or other such representative who has appeared therein. If the party against whom judgment by default is sought has appeared in the action, he (or, if appearing by representative, his representative) shall be served with written notice of the application for judgment at least 7 days prior to the hearing on such application. If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper and shall accord a right of trial by jury to the parties when and as required by statute. ================================== My questions: A) What is the effect of a judgment on a party which as in this case is represented by counsel, who has been properly served with Summons and Complaint but has failed to file an answer to the Complaint? Is such a party bound by that judgment? B) Is there any disadvantage to my filing, on April 4, 2009 a notice which will make "appear by affidavit or otherwise" the fact that the defendant the Nantucket Building Department has failed to plead or otherwise defend the case? C) Assuming then that the Nantucket Building Department's attorneys make a motion to have the default set aside, and a second motion to be permitted to file their Answer "nunc pro tunc", should I oppose such motions, on the reasoning that these same attorneys maintained for 18 months a groundless defense which they attempted to support the fabrication of certain evidence and the concealment of other evidence behind a screen of a forged transcription? Or should I not oppose such motions, on the consideration that i) if I prevailed against the Board of State Examiners a default judgment would be redundant, and ii) if the Board of State Examiners prevailed against me, a default judgment against the Nantucket Building Department would be ineffective and would be superseded, and iii) that my offer to demonstrate criminal behavior by the Town of Nantucket and its attorneys would be unnecessarily inflammatory and would prejudice the Court against me. A lot to talk about. When and if you have time, please telephone me. 617-484-8109. I very much enjoy talking with you. Thanks for everything. Sincerely, Ernst Meyer