What I will tell the Supreme Judicial Court in my application
for direct appellate review, occurred to me this morning as
I was waking from the nights sleep. I must write it down
before I forget:

That my appeal is worthy of the consideration of the SJC,
because my appeal addresses an anomaly that is corrosive
of public respect for the law: the discrepancy between the
prevalence of Do-It-Yourself plumbing which invests it with
a presumption of legality and the prohibition of Do-It-Yourself
plumbing by the Board of State Examiners of Plumbers and Gasfitters,
which the Attorney General refuses to defend in court and
which the Attorney General declines to enforce in the 302
and more hardware and home improvement stores that enable
Do-It-Yourself-Plumbing.  Such contradiction makes mockery
of the law and deserves the SJC's attention.

That my appeal is worthy of the consideration of the SJC,
because my appeal addresses a fundamental issue of legal
literary interpretation of an ancient statute which has
survived into a changed world. This of course is the recurring
question, how should the U.S. Constitution of 1789 be 
construed 210 years later, when the society has so drastically
changed. I shall point out to the SJC that _all_ language
derives meaning from the context in which it is used,
that every student of language understand that the meaning
is in flux, and that the attempt to assign to a word a fixed
meaning is a futile exercise in antiquarianism. The correct
interpretation of the law of 1894 is implicit in the practice
that is prevalent in 2009. Hence the propriety of the Attorney
General's refusal to accede to the interpretation of the Board.
(An antiquarian interpretation would lead to the same conclusion,
inasmuch as in 1894 technical obstacles precluded Do-It-Yourself
plumbing. It did not then exist.)

That my appeal is worthy of the consideration of the SJC,
because my appeal addresses a fundamental issue of jurisprudence,
i.e. the court's obligation to take judicial notice of its own
records. In our judicial tradition, the court has virtually
unlimited discretion in its interpretation of experience;
that interpretation then becomes "common" law. In order to
serve its function as law, the judgment must become incarnate
in language. The judgment requires to be articulated in words,
sentences and paragraphs. Aside from possible logical or substantive
error in the Court's determination in the instant case, to the effect
that Nantucket should be accorded the status of a party even though
Nantucket was not an Intervenor, and that the Attorney General should 
be deemed to join in an action which the Attorney General
had declined to make in her own behalf or in that of her client,
over these possible logical or substantive errors, there looms
of perhaps greater importance the Court's procedural error in
failing to give reasons or other explanations for these crucial
decisions. It is this failure which creates the presumption
that the Court did not take notice of its records and permits
the spectre of injustice to intrude into the adjudicatory process.

That my appeal is worthy of the consideration of the SJC,
because my appeal addresses a fundamental issue in Constitutional law,
whether the officers of Agencies of the Commonwealth should be
held to the same standards of legal probity as ordinary citizens.
In this instance, whether public interest requires and public
policy condones that they should an official record should be
falsified with impunity, and that then those responsible,
knowing its falsity, should make multiple affirmations of its truth.
The Board's disdain for logic in the interpretation of
G.L.c.142 Sec 1,3, is of the same cloth as the disrespect
for verity, to put it politely, in the embroidery of its
decision. If I had acted similarly, I should consider myself
as risk of prosecuting for serious crimes. I do not ask
that any person be embarrassed or hurt in any way by being
charged with misconduct. As a matter of fact, I ask 
that no person be embarrassed or hurt in any way by being
charged with misconduct. But what I do ask is that the
agency not be permitted the fruits of its misconduct,
and that the Board's Decision and Order be set aside
on account of the improprieties that it reflects.
If this Court gave the agencies and officers of the
Commonwealth to understand that it will not permit
them to enjoy the consequences of serious violation of
the law, such a ruling would help to maintain the 
confidence in our legal system, concern for which
this Court eloquently expressed in Re: Keenan.

Nor can it be assumed that because I had freely admitted
performingly the objectionable plumbing, and had been
advised that it was deemed unlawful by the Town,
that a bit of fabricated evidence was of no import.
The purpose of the fabrication was to make it appear
that I had received as full and fair hearing,
when in fact the opposite was the case.
And what might such a full an fair hearing have shown?
That my house couldn't contaminate the Town water-supply
if only because it was three miles removed.
That none of the experts on the Board were able to
advance any scheme by which my lack of skill might
have endangered to public health, 
that the plumbing inspector himself was not conversant
with the plumbing code.
That the punishment being inflicted on me was not
customary or routine; that it was not the inspector's
decision, but the decision of other Town officials
that my plumbing shoud be destroyed.

This Court has written eloquently about events that

"would be harmful to the administration of justice,
would lower confidence in the integrity of the courts
and in their determination and ability thoroughly to
uproot evil practices when once discovered, would discourage
efforts at improvement, and would be wholly incompatible
with the public interest." Matter of Keenan, 314 Mass 544 (1943)
(50 N.E. 2d 785)

That my appeal is worthy of the consideration of the SJC,
because my appeal addresses a fundamental issues of constitutionality
made more poignant by the burdens which the Administrative
Procedure Act (G.L.c.30A) places on both the agencies that are
governed by it and their clients. It is true that many if not
most of the controversies that concern administrative agencies
appear to be matters well within the agency's area of expertise.

"The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious,
even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow men,
have had a good deal more to do than the syllgism in determining
the rules by which men should be governed." Oliver Wendell Holmes,
The Common Law, Lecture 1.