Dear Marion,

The ruminations about idealization and deidealization
in which I indulged in my previous letter
were far from complete.
Offhand I recognize, corresponding to four
traditional rubrics of "philosophy",
at least four variants of the use of
the term idealization:
1) ethical idealization, - the assumption
that "God" is "good", that the world is good,
that human nature is "good",
and with sheepish embarrassment,
that I also am good, - or
can make myself good by "repenting"
and "confessing" my sins.
cf Plato.
2) logical idealization, - the assumption 
that language is intelligibile and corresponds to reality,
that the names which we give to objects certifies their identity.
3) esthetic idealization, - the assumption that the
spatial and temporal continuity which I perceive
is reliable, notwithstanding the circumstance
that such continuity is contradicted by the
occurrence of events and the appearance of objects.
Esthetic idealizations are enshrined in mathematics.
4) epistemic idealization, the implicit assumption
that my knowledge of the world and of myself is complete,
that what I don't know doesn't exist,
that what I can't understand is unintelligible.
Epistemic idealization is the ultimate inability
to come to terms with my ignorance.

In these hypotheses there's more than enough cud to chew for a
life-time, and certainly for the few months or years remaining
to me; and enough grist to keep the epistolary mill grinding,
as long as your patience holds out.

The ethical idealization, it seems to me,
is the most accessible to argument.