Dear Mr. Garmel, Thank you, as always, for your interest and concern about my litigation with Nantucket. When I told Judge Mcdonald at the hearing that because of the delay, I, being 82 years old, had already lost the case, that statement was true only with respect to my ability personally to install the insulation, tile the floors, hang the inside doors and cabinets, perform the finish carpentry and do whatever else was necessary to make the property rentable. Those tasks would have absorbed time and energy which I have put to other uses. Instead of laboring on Nantucket, I've spent the summers vacationing in the family home in the Virginia mountains where I grew up, watching the hummingbirds, cardinals, indigo buntings, chickadees ... adding to a novel about, among other topics, life on an island, and most important, getting old gracefully and serenely with my mental faculties reasonably intact. The Nantucket litigation has turned into one of the most exhilarating experiences in my life, comparable to climbing the Presidentials in New Hampshire or hiking in the back- country of the Canadian Rockies. I am fascinated by the spiritual contest with Judge Mcdonald who is torn between his desire to rule in favor of established authority and his wish not to be overruled a second time by the Appeals Court. He procrastinates in the hope that something will turn up to support a judgment against me, but instead Mr. Ciarmataro complicates matters with the contradiction that my plumbing demonstrates such inferior workmanship that there's no choice but to condemn it, but that it also demonstrates such substance that I couldn't have installed the plumbing without a plumber's help, and that when I claim to have done it myself, I must be lying. Perhaps I'm repeating myself with the anecdote from Leonard Boudin, then a visiting professor at Harvard Law School, who recounted arguing a case before the US Supreme Court and newly appointed Justice Rehnquist who declined to recuse himself for having worked on the case as Solicitor General. Boudin's comment, made forty years ago, has never stopped ringing in my ears, "The Government lies, the Government always lies." And so it does. The seminal case is Olmstead v. U.S. 277 US 438, where in an oft quoted dissent Justice Brandeis wrote piously: "Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy." But Chief Justice Taft, joined by Justices McReynolds, Sanford, Sutherland, and Van Devanter was realistic in rejecting Brandeis' argument. Governance without lying is as impossible as being elected to public office without lying. Ask Mitt Romney. The Executive must lie in order to govern, the Legislature must lie (obfuscate) in the unavoidable compromises entailed in enacting laws, and the Judiciary must lie when as a matter of practicality it must systematically ignore procedure to reach the merits. In its decision of my case the Appeals Court: a) validated a sham hearing before the Board of State Examiners, b) endorsed a false certification by the Attorney General, c) ignored the circumstances that Nantucket was not properly a party for having failed to intervene, d) that the Attorney General had defaulted by failing to file an answer, e) that the Attorney General had deceived the Court by concealing the fact that she deemed herself only a "nominal" defendant, and therefore under no obligation to file a reply. The Appeals Court ignored all these procedural irregularities because it found itself obligated to adjudicate on the merits, to wit: 1) because the justices wouldn't know how to install a toilet, you and I shouldn't be permitted to do so either. 2) a person such as myself shouldn't be punished for being competent. - The pretence of adjudicating the merits of a controversy entails the pretence of truthful evidence. The pretence of adjudicating on the merits will be undermined by openly tolerated fabrication of evidence. That is why the Brandeis illusion is indispensable for the administration of justice. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court will agree with me that it cannot tolerate the systematic premeditated fabrication of evidence by Nantucket, especially after I point out that Nantucket's lawyer, Mr. Pucci, represents also 119 other Massachusetts municipalities. If the Court allows Mr. Ciarmataro's fabrication of evidence, Mr. Pucci will be duty bound to inform those other clients that it's o.k. to make up a story if that's what it takes to accomplish a politically desirable result. After 85 years, the shadow of Sacco and Vanzetti continues to loom over the Massachusetts courts. Never mind absolute truth. The pole star by which the Court charts its decisions is the preservation of its authority. On account of the division of powers under the tripartite constitution, the Court is powerless to punish the Executive or the Legislature. Its duties however, include establishing "justice" between the executive and legislature on the one hand, and corporate or private persons on the other hand. As the courts are precluded from levying penalties on the Attorney General for wrongful prosecutions, no matter how wicked, so they are precluded from levying sanctions on Nantucket for its premeditated fabrication of evidence. The courts' only recourse for preserving their authority is to assess damages, substantial damages, against Nantucket to compensate litigants such as myself for the injuries that have been inflicted on them. As to the amount of damages, I proceed from the truism that "justice is blind," i.e. justice postulates the duties it imposes to be symmetrical. To ascertain what is just, one blindfolds the goddess and switches plaintiff and defendant. The damages properly assessed against Nantucket for having broken the law - and what more serious breach of law could be conceivable than to use that law as an instrument of persecution by fabricating evidence and silencing witnesses by threats of injury? - the damages properly assessed against Nantucket would be equal to the fine for which I would have been liable had I made myself guilty of violating the law. That fine is $1000 a day, each day being a separate offense. Nantucket having persisted in its wrongdoing for 2450 days should be ordered to pay damages of $2,450,000.- The longer the case drags on, the bigger the reward. It's a win-win proposition that makes Candide in his best of all possible worlds look like a wretch. Obviously a pipe dream fueled by endogenous fantasy. The probability of success seems to me so low, that the gamble would not be financially rational. I doubt that a "prestigious" law firm would even be willing to consider the case and make an offer without charging substantial fees. Given my unwillingness to incur any legal charges at all, I lack the chutzpah to make an approach to any lawyer. If you think that under the circumstances further discussion between us would be of any use, please e-mail me the most convenient time to telephone. I thank you, as always, for your sympathy and concern, and in the instance, for the effort of reading my wordy letter. Sincerely, Ernst Meyer