My memory such as it is, I don't know whether to imagine
you in Belmont or in Salt Lake City, but wherever you are,
I wish that you are well and happy.

Thank you again for sending the Quicken data. As I've written
before, I'm much pleased that you are taking an active interest
in the financial accounts. I hope that you will continue to do so.

The immediate consequence of my exposure to Quicken has been
for me to question the security of the procedures I've been
following. As of today nothing been lost but I want to do what
I can to lock the barn before the horse is out.

For the past two weeks, I've been receiving each day two e-mail
messages such as I'm forwarding to you. I ignored them until
yesterday when I thought it would be a good idea to check on
the balances of the two accounts. That is when I discovered the
established login-password combination no longer functioned.

This morning I telephoned Cambridge Savings Bank for confirmation
of the current balance information.  I was asked to identify myself
by giving the last 4 digits of my social security number and my
place of birth. I was informed of the balance on the Keogh account.
It was correct. I was denied information about the balance in the
Family Trust.  Nonetheless the officer with whom I spoke offered to
change the passwords to both accounts to give me Internet access!

I infer: a) that the CSB employees are proceeding by rote
without understanding the implications of what they are doing.
b) that the Quicken program is challenged with security
questions each time it accesses an account - hence the 
messages I receive and in the process automatically changes
the password. Thus arguably the Quicken program, generating
a new more secure password (at each access?) is (much) safer
than what I have been doing.

If money were lost from an account, the Bank would be nominally
responsible, but would try to avoid liability by claiming
contributory negligence. That's the score on which I must
improve my procedures and be very careful.

I've identified several security holes in my procedures and
would like to discuss with you what (if anything) I should do
to close them. Obviously this is not appropriate discussion for
e-mail. Ideally, face to face, but if the hearing is postponed
and we stay in Konnarock for too long a time possibly by telephone,
Meanwhile I shall keep very close watch on the presumptively
vulnerable accounts.

As I mentioned, today everything was in order, subject to the
fact that I could access neither the Cambridge Savings Bank
accounts nor your Morgan Stanley account. But these I believe
to be (relatively) safe.

I also adjudge myself, at this juncture, to be a little bit
hysterical. Please take that into account and don't let yourself
be distracted by my exposition. Please don't feel that you need
to reply, or even to acknowledge this e-mail.