OUTFLOW VI CHOROIDAL CIRCULATION Let us make a model of drainage from the choroidal circulation. In Issue No. 11 of the Glaucoma Letter we discussed the venous drainage from the retinal circulation. Inferences that can readily me made from retinoscopic observation alone made it possible for us to give explanations for the phenomena of A-V nicking, of increased V/A ratio in arteriosclerotic and hypertensive vascular disease. Such observations also suggested a possible mechanism for the selective distribution of glaucomatous optic nerve damage, and by extension suggested that it might be impairment of the venous circulation that was responsible for the optic atrophy and excavation in glaucoma rather than impairment of arterial circulation as has hitherto been assumed. In addition, and perhaps not least in importance, reflections on the mechanisms of venous drainage from the retinal circulation forced on us as they were by the simple process of observation, by the need to explain and the desire to understand what is so readily observable, provide us with tools to think about venous drainage in general and give us courage to consider other mechanisms of venous drainage in the eye that are more or less inaccessible to inspection. We have long been so concerned about the mechanisms by which aqueous humor drains from the eye, that we have taken the drainage mechanisms of the retinal circulation for granted, and the choroidal circulation we have ignored as if it did not even exist. The mountaineer who aspired to climb Mount Everest but spurned to practice ascent of lesser summits would have little chance of success. Nor is it necessary to assume that there should be some a priori similarity between the drainage of blood and that of aqueous. To be sure, the issue of similarity and difference when we undertake to analyse and to describe phenomena, biologic and otherwise, is a touchy one. The reason we systematically deny judgment from similarity is that it betrays the veracity of objective determinations. When we point out that one thing is similar to another, we reveal the nature of our intellectual apprehension, but unless we are so bold as to postulate an apriori generic identity, we say nothing at all about the thing that we purport to explain. Rather we demonstrate our inability to grasp that which we seek to understand. To say that Jones is like Smith, where Jones and Smith are by nomenclature different, is to admit that we are unable to distinguish one from the other, is to admit that we comprehend neither of them, and to demonstrate the particular level at which our understanding is arrested. There is, however, another aspect to this issue which becomes apparent once we forgo our insistence that we should comprehend and control the object and accept the fact that, where what we know is limited, the way in which we know it may be the only facet of our cognitive experience susceptible to correction and improvement. * * * * *

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