OUTFLOW VI
CHOROIDAL CIRCULATION
Let us make a model of drainage from the choroidal
circulation.
In Issue No. 11 of the Glaucoma Letter we discussed the
venous drainage from the retinal circulation. Inferences
that can readily me made from retinoscopic observation alone
made it possible for us to give explanations for the
phenomena of A-V nicking, of increased V/A ratio in
arteriosclerotic and hypertensive vascular disease. Such
observations also suggested a possible mechanism for the
selective distribution of glaucomatous optic nerve damage,
and by extension suggested that it might be impairment of
the venous circulation that was responsible for the optic
atrophy and excavation in glaucoma rather than impairment of
arterial circulation as has hitherto been assumed. In
addition, and perhaps not least in importance, reflections
on the mechanisms of venous drainage from the retinal
circulation forced on us as they were by the simple process
of observation, by the need to explain and the desire to
understand what is so readily observable, provide us with
tools to think about venous drainage in general and give us
courage to consider other mechanisms of venous drainage in
the eye that are more or less inaccessible to inspection.
We have long been so concerned about the mechanisms by which
aqueous humor drains from the eye, that we have taken the
drainage mechanisms of the retinal circulation for granted,
and the choroidal circulation we have ignored as if it did
not even exist. The mountaineer who aspired to climb Mount
Everest but spurned to practice ascent of lesser summits
would have little chance of success.
Nor is it necessary to assume that there should be some
a priori similarity between the drainage of blood and that
of aqueous. To be sure, the issue of similarity and
difference when we undertake to analyse and to describe
phenomena, biologic and otherwise, is a touchy one. The
reason we systematically deny judgment from similarity is
that it betrays the veracity of objective determinations.
When we point out that one thing is similar to another, we
reveal the nature of our intellectual apprehension, but
unless we are so bold as to postulate an apriori generic
identity, we say nothing at all about the thing that we
purport to explain. Rather we demonstrate our inability to
grasp that which we seek to understand. To say that Jones
is like Smith, where Jones and Smith are by nomenclature
different, is to admit that we are unable to distinguish one
from the other, is to admit that we comprehend neither of
them, and to demonstrate the particular level at which our
understanding is arrested.
There is, however, another aspect to this issue which
becomes apparent once we forgo our insistence that we should
comprehend and control the object and accept the fact that,
where what we know is limited, the way in which we know it
may be the only facet of our cognitive experience
susceptible to correction and improvement.
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Copyright 2006, Ernst Jochen Meyer