 
                           20000805.01

     My theory, in short is this: that the transcendental
apperception of real objects is brought about by unconscious
impressions which these real objects, being seen by the eye or
heard by the ear, leave upon the mind, quite analogous to the
afterimages which a viosual stimulus produces in the retina (or
the visual system). All that is necessary to assume, and this
seems elementary and unobjectionable, is that the conceptual
"afterimage" rather than lasting for fractions of a minute, as
does the visual afterimage, lasts for months or years. One
readily conceives of a visual afterimage so sharp and distinct
that it can serv as a patterns, as a symbolic nucleus, for a
mental image generated by the mind. Such a mental image, since it
is patterned on the afterimage, would necessarily possess some of
the characteristics of the stimulus by which the afterimage was
created. The afterimage, in other words, would serve as a
symbolic form, a lattice, a framework, ein Geruest, the pattern
of which would correspond in some measure to the transcendental
object, to das Ding an Sich, but it would also serve as a pattern
for the perceived object. Because and to the extent that the
symbolic form, the quasi-afterimage correspond to both the
otherwise inaccessible object and to the mental representation of
it, the symbolic form serves as a link between reality and the
mind. There should be no difficulty in accepting the assumption
that in the confrontation between the individual and reality
there should be a subliminal effect on the mind, an unconscious
"transfer of information", to use a modern metaphor, sufficient
to modify the structure of the receiving mind and to provide tha
basis (potential or actual) for the development of a specific
symbolic form, which one might conceive of as being "activated"
by subsequent encounter (confrontation) with the original object
or its analogue. There is, furthermore, no reason that I can
fathom, why the senses, seeing, hearing and touch, should not
function as mediators between the original object and the mental
factulty creative of the symbolic form; with the reservation that
our preconceptions of sensory processes are stereotyped so as to
lead to the mistaken presumption that the apperception of the
value of the symbol was a conscious phenomenon, and the mistaken
presumption also that the value of the symbol so perceived had
the visual, auditory or tactile characteristics either of the
original object or of the final synthetic apperception.


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