20060509.00 "Subjective" is the adjective that I apply to everything which a human being can know about his own past, present, and future consciousness. "Objective" is the adjective that I apply to everything, that a human being can know about the world, past, present, and future, in concert and conjunction with one or more of his fellow human beings. Since a human being can have no knowledge of another's consciousness, objective knowledge and subjective knowledge are mutually exclusive. Man is a social creature, and his objective knowledge is social knowledge. Objective knowledge is knowledge with and through society. Most prominently, language in particular, is a product of society. Language arises from and is possible only in consequence of interaction between two or more human beings. Similarly objective knowledge of the world: science, including both the moral sciences, (J.S.Mill) (Geisteswissen- schaften, history, humanities) and the natural sciences, are inherently communal and social, developed, nurtured, communicated and expressed via linguistic and mathematical symbolism. However, his commitment to public knowledge notwithstanding, man is so disposed that all his social, objective experience of the world elicits in him a unique, individual, private resonance. This individual resonance which coincides with his awareness of himself is also properly identified as subjectivity. Subjective experience resounds within the individual independent of and ofttimes in conflict with the general, publicly noticed knowledge. One characterizes subjectivity as inward, because a man's physical body appears to him as a vessel deep within which he seems to perceive the workings of his consciousness. The representations of the objective world, past, present and or future, in which human beings live and which they report to each other, we call history. History is what human beings have experienced or might have experienced; it is the verbal account of what has happened, or what might have happened in the past, the account of what is happening now and/or what may happen in the future. Ordinarily such representations of the objective world are, by their nature, instigated, stimulated, modulated and controlled by men's immediate and mediate experience. Accounts which do not mesh with or correspond to experienced reality are stigmatized as false, erroneous, untrue; are segregated, secreted, denied, and expunged from the communal memory. The limitations of the realms of experience of individual human beings make it necessary to endorse, corroborate or confirm the validity of the historical tradition by faith or belief. The individual not only cherishes a faith in general truth; he also believes that the specific details of whose transmission he is the beneficiary are true. Since the realm of human experience is very broad, and since the individual is unable to test for its verity all that is transmitted to him, i.e. to test it for the possibility and probability of past present or future experience, truth testing, i.e. deciding whether a given fragment of history is true or false, becomes an important component of his intellectual activity. But even truth testing is a social endeavor. Wide- ranging traditions evolve concerning what should be considered true and what should be dismissed as false. Nontheless junctures arise, and not at all infrequently, when each individual is required to confront a given account and to arrive at a decision, to make a judgment whether that account is to be believed or to be doubted. Thus belief and doubt become tokens of individual experience. Moreover, those moments when faith or doubt distinguish individual insight from the general, public conviction are the moments in which ones individuality, ones subjectivity becomes distinct and undeniable. In experiences of faith and of doubt, the intangible Self of the human being is uniquely expressed and revealed. It requires a not very profound analysis of history to demonstrate: 1) that the linguistic historical description reflects but a pale, anemic image of reality, and that a continuous infusion of the imagination and phantasy of the individual is required to make almost any historical tradition plausible and convincing. 2) that the linguistic tradition is by no means consistent and reliable in its determinations of truth. On the contrary, the conventional tradition of truth is invariably suspect. Its truth remains forever questionable. There is a large body of history which its social and cultural contexts at one time seemed to make believable but which must now be rejected as being specious. The history whose truth can no longer be trusted is now conventionally derogated as myth. The notion of myth does not refer, as is commonly assumed by many authors including Cassirer and Schelling, to a clearly definable and delimited segment of the historical tradition. The notion of myth describes a characteristic which inheres, to a greater or lesser extent, in all historical writing, in everything that is told, in everything that is remembered. 1) The persistence of myth is evidence for the unreliability of history as an objective socially sanctioned representation of reality. Thus myth is a pointer to the circumstance that faith and doubt are indispensable conditions for truthful expression and representation. In this way, myth points to the essential role which self, which subjectivity, has in the determination of truth. 2) All history is tinged with the characteristics of myth. Myth points to the unreliability of history, and to the untrustworthiness of the objective, interpreted world which history purports to describe. To the extent that myth demonstrates the unreliability of conventional objective historical reports, myth creates a spiritual space for the existence of self; plausibly so, because, like myth, self by virtue of its "inward" nature can exist only in the absence of objectivity. Doubt and belief, scepticism and faith are the means by which myth, in a dialectical manner, rescinds the validity of history. Myth cannot be eradicated from history. Its persistence in the fabric of conventional thought makes a laughing-stock of common sense; and by the same token, proves that subjectivity is indispensable to the determination of reality. * * * * *

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