 
                         20060601.00

     With respect to the German philosophy which you say is
too difficult for you, I'm not quite clear about what you
mean by German philosophy.  As commonly used, the term refers
to a synthetic fiction, to a conceit of so-called intellectual
history which implies that a philosophy is a system or pattern
of texts which, with sufficiently diligent study, one can
assimilate, subsequently to be able to reproduce and perhaps
also to summarize.

     I disagree. I would argue that the history of philosophy
is no more philosophy than the history of music is music, or
the history of painting is painting. To comprehend a piece of
music one must perform it, and even then the performance will
be in part an expression of the performer's understanding and
skill. Differences in the performances of various artists
provide ample evidence that no interpretation is conclusive. 
Thus in one perspective, every time one hums a melody one
might claim to have somehow grasped its essence. From another
perspective, no matter how polished and elaborate, ones
performance can never be exhaustive. A conclusive meaning of
any piece of music is unattainable.

     In the same way, realistically, it is impossible to
rethink another person's thoughts, even though he has
bequeathed a written record of them.  At best it might be
possible to imitate or to mimic such thoughts; an effort that
will surely be unsuccessful unless one has learned to think
for oneself: in which case one is not thinking the thoughts
of the model philosopher but ones own. In this perspective it
is misleading to speak of the philosophy of Germans or of any
other people. One can never "understand" a foreign philosophy.
The best one can do is to come to terms with ones own.

     It is, of course, presumptuous of me even to entertain
the thought that anyone might consider my more intricate
abstruse and obscure arguments as constituting some kind of
philosophy; at that juncture, it might be plausible, given
my language bias, to refer to some of what I write as German
philosophy. It would make little difference.

     In any event, I consider the technical exercises in
which I sometimes indulge, - let me leave it at that, - to
be of only marginal significance in my intellectual experience.
I consider them largely defensive: arguments, definitions,
thought patterns, with which I protect myself against the
assertions and claims of authors who presume to adjudicate
the validity of my intuition with their spurious (positivistic)
objectivity. Against such assaults on my individuality 
(subjectivity) my technical exercises seem to me at least,
gratifyingly effective.  I'm always pleased to try to explain
myself, but from my vantage, it isn't necessary.

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Copyright 2006, Ernst Jochen Meyer
