 
                        20071116.00

     The question, the problem  what is philosophy, who and
what is a philosopher, may perhaps best be approached from
a social and or sociological perspective.  The philosopher
is the man (my apologies to feminists) who thinks.  whose
thought is guided (and controlled) by logic (language).
Such thought has power, real or imaginary, which other,
less disciplined cogitation lacks.  Within a social
context, philosophy may be considered a vocation, a
calling, (as being) an activity with which a boy chooses to
be identified "when I grow up." One boy wants to be a
fireman, another a doctor, a third , - well a philosopher.
I would not challenge the assertion that there is
"something wrong" with the one who aspires to philosophy,
at any rate, something different.

     Society makes use of "the philosopher" in different
ways, but is fundamentally hostile to him because of his
pretensions.  In general, the most successful "wise man" is
the one who is naive, who pretends to be ignorant, like
Socrates, who acts bewildered or childlike, perhaps like
Einstein.

     Essential to the philosopher is that he has a secret,
couched in arcane syntax like Kant's, in arcane
mathematics, like Einstein, in arcane expression like
Heidegger or Husserl. Without such a secret intellectual
superiority is inconceivable, intolerable or both.

     It is one thing to slip into the position or pose of a
philosopher fortuitously as it were, like Kant or Einstein,
because one has discovered and expressed a seminal insight.
It is quite another matter deliberately to dress up and to
appear on the academic stage with the label "Department of
Philosophy" pinned to ones lapel. I can think of no more
onerous and embarrassing role to play.

     But even the roles played by individuals with genuine
insight who have fortuitously become famous, e.g. Kant,
Einstein, have limitations which may be discernable at
least to an outsider.  In Kant's case it was, among other
things, the pseudo-rational structure of his exposition; in
Einstein's case the inability to integrate the subjectivity
of all cognition into his schemes.

                     * * * * *
Copyright 2007, Ernst Jochen Meyer
